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ABSTRACT
Aside from bioethics, the main theme of Ronald Green’s lifework has been an
exploration of the relation between religion and morality, with special empha-
sis on the philosophies of Immanuel Kant and Søren Kierkegaard. This essay
summarizes and assesses his work on this theme by examining, in turn, four
of his relevant books. Religious Reason (1978) introduced a new method of
comparative religion based on Kant’s model of a rational religion. Religion and
Moral Reason (1988) expanded on this project, clarifying that religious tradi-
tions cannot be reduced to their moral grounding. Kierkegaard and Kant: The
Hidden Debt (1992) offered bold new evidence that Kant, not Hegel, was the
philosopher whose ideas primarily shaped Kierkegaard’s overtly religious phi-
losophy; both philosophers focused on the problem of how to understand the
relation between moral reasoning and historical religion. And Kant and Kier-
kegaard on Time and Eternity (2011) republished ten essays that explore vari-
ous aspects of this theme in greater depth. I argue that throughout these
works Green defends a “paradox of inwardness”: principles or ideals that are
by their nature essentially inward end up requiring outward manifestation in
order to be confirmed or fully justified as real.
KEY WORDS: Immanuel Kant, Søren Kierkegaard, religion and morality, par-
adox, inwardness
Those who know Ronald Green through his principal work as a bioethi-
cist may be surprised to learn that his corpus also features no less than
four books and at least thirty articles and reviews in an area that might
seem at first to have little if any direct relation to his main field of
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expertise: these other works deal with the ideas put forward by two of
the most influential philosophers of religion, Immanuel Kant and Søren
Kierkegaard. The connection, of course, is that Green’s interest in these
two philosophical giants focuses primarily on their understanding of the
relation between morality and religion, so we might think of the two
aspects of his expertise in terms of the distinction between applied ethics
and pure ethics. I have elsewhere described his 1978 book, Religious
Reason: The Rational and Moral Basis of Religious Belief, which employs
an interpretation of Kant’s view of morality and religion as a spring-
board for introducing a new method of comparative religious studies, as
one of three key works in the 1970s that established the foundation for
what is nowadays sometimes referred to as an “affirmative” approach to
interpreting Kant’s philosophy of religion.1
Kant has often been interpreted as a moral reductionist who claims
that authentic religion is nothing but morality, so that all non-moral ele-
ments should be excised from religious traditions and persons who man-
age to be morally good without adhering to any historical religion are
not missing out on anything essential. Later in this essay I shall be pos-
ing several questions and challenges to Green’s way of portraying Kant,
in hopes of prompting him to clarify whether he, too, thinks Kant was in
any sense a moral reductionist. In any case, Green’s second book on this
topic, his 1988 Religion and Moral Reason: A New Method for Compara-
tive Study, makes abundantly clear that, on his own view, religion is
rooted in a “moral point of view” in such a way that religious traditions
cannot be reduced to this moral grounding. As early as the preface he
clarifies, while commenting on examples from Chinese religions, “that
while religion may be actuated by moral concerns, it is not reducible to a
series of moral teachings” (1988, xiv).2 What remains unclear is whether
he sees himself as following or departing from Kant on this point.
Probably the most influential of Green’s four books in this general
area is the third, his 1992 Kierkegaard and Kant: The Hidden Debt,
which set out ground-breaking evidence that the philosopher whose
ideas primarily shaped and set the parameters for Kierkegaard’s overtly
religious philosophy was not Hegel, as had so often been assumed, but
Kant. For both Kierkegaard and Kant the problem of how to understand
the relation between moral reasoning and historical religion was the
1 See “Editors’ Introduction” to Firestone and Palmquist 2006, 15–30.
2 On the next page Green adds: “Ritual is not reducible to moral instruction” (1988, xv).
In a subsequent essay (Green 2000), he did tend to portray Kierkegaard as accusing Kant
of moral reductionism. But that this may not be Green’s own view of the matter was evi-
denced by the fact that he toned down this tendency when he revised this essay for its
republication in Firestone and Palmquist 2006, 157–75. For a detailed defense of the non-
reductionist status of Kant’s philosophy of religion, see Palmquist 1992.
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driving force of their theories of religion. And for both (as well as for
Green, as I shall argue in the remainder of this essay), this problem
proved to be so deeply rooted in human nature and yet so essential to
our self-understanding that it can be regarded quite properly as an
intractable paradox.
As if to remind his colleagues and students in applied ethics that he has
always had one foot in the philosophy of religion (through his interest in
pure moral theory), Green recently compiled ten of his essays on Kant and
Kierkegaard into the 2011 book, Kant and Kierkegaard on Time and Eter-
nity. In what follows I shall be dipping briefly into this and each of the
three previously mentioned books, with a view toward demonstrating that
the driving force behind this portion of Green’s scholarly work—a force
that surely served as a not-so-hidden debt influencing his work in applied
ethics as well—is what I shall call the paradox of inwardness.
The paradox of inwardness—or paradoxes (for as we shall see, the par-
adox manifests itself in many different forms)—always exhibits the same
essential features. A principle or ideal that is by its nature essentially
inward ends up requiring outward manifestation in order to be con-
firmed or fully justified as real. While Kant tends to write in his purely
moral works as if the categorical imperative is so utterly formal that no
such manifestation is required—the form alone, and only the form,
makes the moral law true and worthy of our commitment—a careful
analysis of his Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason (1793/94)
reveals that a paradox of inwardness, which (in retrospect) seems uncan-
nily Kierkegaardian, governs the entire exposition. Interpreters such as
Gordon Michalson, who approach Kant’s book with the expectation that
Kant intends to provide a typically rationalist, logically consistent analy-
sis of religion, are bound to come away with the impression that the
sage of K€onigsberg was unable to decide on which side his allegiance lay
whenever he discussed the interplay between specific historical religious
traditions and what he calls “the religion of reason”3 (see Kant 2016, 12–
13, 110, 112–14, 121–23, 135n, 152, 157–59, 162, 165). By contrast,
Green’s first book, picking up on the built-in paradox that we human
beings experience within our own reason whenever we attempt to act
upon choices we have made about what we ought to do, aptly dubs this
phenomenon “religious reason.” Just to cite one of many examples of his
acknowledgement of Kant’s affirmation of the paradox of inwardness in
this first book, he there writes that Kant’s “own thinking on religion
reveals a constant movement between various traditional theistic affir-
mations and what could be called a mysticism of reason—a profound
regard for the internal voice of reason and conscience” (1978, 77). Part
3 Kant’s word Vernunftreligion is also often translated “rational religion.”
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One culminates with a table that enumerates seven points (some with
detailed subpoints) in a Kantian account of religious reason (1978, 109),
which are then applied in Part Two to several examples of historical reli-
gious traditions. My only criticism of Green’s table, assuming we read it
as an interpretation of Kant’s Religion rather than as an expression of
Green’s own (Kantian) position, is that it says nothing at all about the
crucial role symbolism plays in Kant’s understanding of the healthy
functioning of religion. Symbolism is the chief tool through which Kant
applies the paradox of inwardness in Religion, so any attempt to exam-
ine religious traditions in a Kantian manner without a focus on their
symbolic structure seems partial at best.
Shortly after the publication of Religious Reason, Green published an
article that has been largely neglected by Kant scholars, presenting “A
Kantian Perspective” on “Religious Ritual” (Green 1979). Indeed, I only
became aware of this article recently, while preparing the final draft of
my book Comprehensive Commentary on Kant’s Religion within the
Bounds of Bare Reason (Palmquist 2016a). Fortunately, I was able to
graft in a few references to this important article, which bucks a com-
mon trend in Kant scholarship. Typically, anyone who writes about
Kant’s Religion is three times more likely to write about his theory of
evil than about any other theme, twice as likely to write about his theory
of the ethical community than about any of the remaining themes, and
sure to write about Kant’s theory of grace (or the alleged lack thereof) if
they are not writing about either evil or the ethical community. Ignoring
the convention whereby commentators tend to neglect the fourth and
final of the four essays or “pieces” (St€ucken), as Kant calls them, which
constitute the book, Green’s article examines Kant’s interpretation of the
Christian ritual of baptism, which Kant elaborates in a single paragraph
just three pages before the end of his book.
In private correspondence with Green a few years ago, we toyed with
the possibility of co-editing or co-authoring a book that would extend
Kant’s perspective on ritual more widely than one could accomplish in a
single article. In the hope that something might someday come of those
joint musings, I shall add a few words about this neglected work of
Green’s. His essay correctly recognizes that Kant’s aim is not to reduce
rituals such as baptism to nothing but a moral meaning, but to ensure
that its practitioners do, at least, give it such a meaning; this is the
minimum core of a rational theory of why initiation rites occur in virtu-
ally every form of religious tradition. Without taking sides on the conten-
tious issue of infant baptism versus believer’s baptism, Kant argues, in a
nutshell, that baptism has the potential to be “a very significant festivity
which imposes great obligation either on the inductee-to-be, if he is him-
self able to confess his faith, or on the witnesses who pledge to attend to
his education in it, and it aims at something holy (molding a human
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being into a citizen of a divine nation)” (Kant 2016, 199). Much of
Green’s essay concerns an assessment of the Christian theological tradi-
tion and a demonstration that Kant’s moral interpretation—as well as
his warning that baptism is not a “means of grace” despite the fact that
some practitioners superstitiously believe they can use it to force God to
“wash away all sins at once” (Kant 2016, 199)—is actually well repre-
sented in that tradition (Green 1979, 235–37).
So far so good. But here Green raises a criticism, against which I wish to
speak in Kant’s defense: he complains that Kant displays a lack of awareness
of the long and rich religious and theological tradition he is critiquing. First,
the fact that Kant says nothing about the theological tradition regarding bap-
tism does not mean he was unaware of it. For in the preface to the first edition
of Religion, Kant argues that the domains of scholarship appropriate to the
biblical theologian and the philosophical theologian must be kept carefully
distinct, even though the two types of scholars should aim to “be united”
(2016, 10) when it comes to the essential purposes of studying religion. I inter-
pret Kant’s silence on the tradition not as evidence of his ignorance, but as
evidence of his careful lack of presumption: he seeks to leave to the type of
scholar whom Kant calls the “biblical theologian” the important task of filling
in all the historical details relating to traditional theological interpretations
of the symbolism of rituals such as baptism. Kant’s role as philosophical theo-
logian is simple and direct: to insist that the moral meaning be kept at the
core of what both types of theologians do; and this is precisely what he does in
his short paragraph on baptism. Green’s criticism is well placed to the extent
that Kant’s brief treatment of this ritual admittedly does nothing to highlight
the profound way in which baptism symbolizes the paradox of inwardness—
for example, by depicting the believer as dying (to time?) yet living (to eterni-
ty?). However, in Kant’s defense, he surely regarded this work of fleshing out
the symbolism through dialogue with the historical interpretive tradition as
the task of the biblical theologian. That is, for Kant to have done what Green
does in his article, mining the theological tradition for evidence that baptism
as traditionally interpreted often does serve as a profound moral symbol,
would have been for him to stray into the domain of the biblical theologian,
and this was something Kant believed would have been entirely inappropri-
ate, given his firm belief in the separation of the sciences.
At first sight the title of Green’s second book in this series, Religion
and Moral Reason, might give the impression that he is backing away
from his initial radical claim, that reason is essentially religious and as
such has a paradox at its very heart; for he now refers to “moral reason”
rather than “religious reason.” Yet his Introduction explains otherwise.
He begins by outlining the “three essential elements” that constitute the
“deep structure” of all religions: first, religions all involve adopting “the
moral point of view”; second, they formulate beliefs “affirming the reality
of moral retribution”; and third, they also formulate various
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“‘transmoral’ beliefs that suspend moral judgment and retribution
when this is needed to overcome moral paralysis and despair” (1988, 3).
As it turns out, each of these elements involves paradox to some
extent—though “not overt self-contradiction” (1988, 4). Green’s first illus-
tration is the “familiar paradox of the moral life,” whereby “self-denial
and self-restraint are conditions of human happiness and self-
fulfillment.” He then wastes no time in praising “Kant’s pioneering effort
to develop systematically the paradoxical truths underlying the moral
life” (1988, 5).
Let me pause here to offer another mild critical reflection on Green’s
claim regarding the deep structure of (what I prefer to continue calling)
religious reason. In the spirit of Carl Jung’s claim that patterns of whole-
ness always come in fours, so that threefold patterns always conceal
within them a “missing fourth”—a claim, incidentally, that Jung adapted
from Kant’s deeply rooted trust in architectonic logic, where synthesis
always exhibits itself in threefold patterns and analysis in fourfold pat-
terns4—I suggest that a fourth candidate for the deep structure of reli-
gious reason is its culmination in what I am here calling the paradox of
inwardness. Interestingly, in Religious Reason Green had already provid-
ed his own version of a fourfold structure, but one with a more explicitly
Kantian grounding: he there portrays reason as having distinctly theo-
retical, prudential, moral, and religious employments (1978, 4). The
fourth employment arises directly out of the paradoxical impasse that
occurs between the second and third employments: “Religious reason
arises because of an important conflict between prudential and moral
reason, and it represents reason’s effort to bring its own program to a
coherent conclusion” (1978, 4). Admittedly, Green proposes a different
distinction here than in Religion and Moral Reason. My point is only
that I would have liked to have seen a more explicit effort to synthesize
the two sets of distinctions, such that the “deep structure” examined in
the second book in this series might have also exhibited a fourth element
that would similarly draw the other three to their proper culmination.
Again, I suggest this fourth element would have been the feature that
drives Kantian religion to border on the mystical: namely, the paradox of
inwardness.
I turn now, very briefly, to what is widely regarded as Green’s most sub-
stantial contribution to Kant scholarship to date—his demonstration of the
extent to which Kant’s writings influenced Kierkegaard, sometimes in ways
4 See, for example, Kant 2001, 82–83 (197n in the Akademie pagination). In Palmquist
1993 (especially Chapters III and VII–IX) I examine in considerable detail how the hints
Kant provides in this important footnote work themselves out in the structural divisions he
tends to make in his main Critical works. In Palmquist 2000 I then extend this to an exam-
ination of the structural divisions in Kant’s Religion.
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that Kierkegaard seems to have been intent on keeping hidden. In the wake
of Green’s ground-breaking study, it would be difficult to deny that, if Kierke-
gaard is the father of theistic existentialism, then Kant surely is one of its
grandfathers. But without commenting on any of the detailed arguments pre-
sented in Kierkegaard and Kant: The Hidden Debt, I shall limit my comments
on this book of exacting scholarship to the observation that the book’s argu-
ment leads to a supplementary question that, to the best of my recollection,
Green does not address in the book itself: What exactly is the status of Kieke-
gaard’s Kant? That is, does Kierkegaard portray Kant’s philosophy of religion
accurately? Or could it be that Kierkegaard’s “hidden debt” extends even fur-
ther than Green so boldly proposes and that some of Kierkegaard’s supposed
reactions to Kant were actually first proposed by Kant himself? If I am correct
in claiming that the paradox of inwardness is the foundation stone of Kant’s
Religion, then some such intensification of Green’s argument begins to seem
plausible.
Green’s turn to bioethics occurred in the mid-1990s, shortly after his
publication of The Hidden Debt. Interestingly, in Religion and Moral
Reason, apparently prescient of this impending turn, he states that his
interest in the philosophy of religion is “scientific,” and then (1988, xi,
xii), compares his work in tracing the “deep structure” of religion and
morality to that of “a molecular biologist investigating the mechanisms
of genetic inheritance.” (Remember, those words were published in the
decade prior to Green’s turn to bioethics!) At the risk of pressing this
point too far, I suggest that the most profound expression of the para-
dox of inwardness may well come not in the realm of religious reason
per se, but in the realm of sexual ethics. For not only is the human
expression of sexual love highly paradoxical, inasmuch as the sex act
is an essentially external phenomenon yet one that involves the bodily
organs and fluids of two persons interpenetrating each other in the
most intimate manner, but also its natural outcome (pregnancy)
presents precisely the inverse paradox: pregnancy is an essentially
internal phenomenon within a woman whose bodily fluids become
those of the developing fetus, yet this new life developing within her is
somehow independent of her own. The ethical issues surrounding sex
and pregnancy are so extraordinarily acute precisely because they
bring us closer than any other human experiences to the core of what
makes us who we are.
Perhaps this example of the paradox of inwardness helps to explain
how the two main areas of Green’s scholarly career are actually united
at the deepest level. Indeed, it is not insignificant to note that both Kant
and Kierkegaard included reflections on these very issues in their writ-
ings on morality and religion. Kant, for example, seems to claim at one
point in Religion’s first “piece” that the propensity to evil begins its influ-
ence over a person through an act of “free volition” that occurs during
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pregnancy (see Kant 2016, 21–22)5—a view that Green the bioethicist
might not find so palatable. Similarly, Kant devotes a lengthy footnote to
a treatment of the virgin birth that might seem disingenuous, at least to
readers who are unaware that the paradox of inwardness is at the fore-
front of Kant’s concern: far from rejecting the doctrine outright, as a
traditional reading of Kant-the-arch-rationalist would require, Kant-the-
Critical-mystic6 tells us that this doctrine “is an idea of reason accommo-
dating itself to a moral instinct, as it were, that is difficult to figure out
and yet also not to be denied” (2016, 80n).
Even more dramatically, Kierkegaard devotes serious consideration
to Kant’s proposals, especially in The Concept of Anxiety (2014),
where he discusses at length the question of how the origin of sin
and anxiety relates to sex and pregnancy.7 My impression is that in
his work on bioethics Green has not treated the approaches that
Kant and Kierkegaard take on these issues as seriously as he might
have treated them. Perhaps this is because their views appear out-
moded to many modern readers. Nevertheless, the form of their
approach, insofar as both thinkers are so deeply cognizant of the par-
adox of inwardness, may be more instructive than Green has
acknowledged in his work up to now. I believe a similar prefiguring
of Kierkegaardian themes relating to love and passion could be
shown to exist in comments about love, sex, and hereditary sin that
Kant scatters across Religion. Why did Kant leave these themes
5 Admittedly, this interpretation depends on how Kant’s German is translated at this
point. In Palmquist 2016a, I translate the key passage as follows: “But since the first basis
for the adoption of our maxims, which must itself always lie in turn in free volition, cannot
be a fact that could be given in experience, the good or the evil in the human being (as the
subjective first basis for the adoption of this or that maxim in regard to the moral law) is
called innate merely in this sense, that it is laid at the basis (in earliest youth, up to [the
point of] birth, back) prior to any use of freedom that is given in experience, and thus is
presented as present in the human being simultaneously with birth—[though] not exactly
as having birth as its cause.” The phrasing of the second parenthetical clause suggests
Kant is referring here to pregnancy: the very earliest stage of “youth” that proceeds “up to”
birth.
6 See Palmquist 2016b. My argument there (and in Palmquist 2000, chapters II, X, and
XII) is that, although some of Kant’s most caustic remarks about mysticism are directed
against a certain type of mystic, his whole philosophy can be regarded as a foundation for a
new type of appreciation for religious experience, which I call “Critical mysticism”—a posi-
tion that takes on board the absolute need for such experience to enhance rather than
detract from our moral nature.
7 See, for example, Kierkegaard 2014, 88: “In the moment of conception, spirit is furthest
away and for that reason the anxiety is the greatest. In this anxiety, the new individual
comes into being. In the moment of birth, anxiety culminates a second time in the woman,
and that instant the new individual enters the world.” Here Kierkegaard is explicitly exam-
ining that period of earliest youth between conception and birth to which Kant alluded (see
footnote 5).
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relatively undeveloped? Once again, he would have regarded such
further development, at least in its religious application, as the task
of the biblical theologian.
As proof to the academic world that he has not stopped thinking
about these pure philosophical issues during his decades-long sojourn
into the increasingly intricate controversies of twenty-first-century bio-
ethics, Green’s most recent book on Kant and Kierkegaard highlights
the paradox of inwardness in its very title: for there are no two words
that better express this paradox, arising as it does when the knowable
and the unknowable intersect, than “time” and “eternity.” In a single
essay I cannot do justice to the range of topics covered by the ten
articles reprinted in that volume, so here I will merely select for closer
examination several comments Green makes in his Introduction. These
comments bring to the fore a concern I have had about Green’s work
ever since I first became acquainted with Religious Reason as a gradu-
ate student at Oxford in the 1980s. The concern is that, whereas on
the one hand much of his work on Kant accurately and adequately
acknowledges that Kant really was interested in affirming religion, not
just an ethical surrogate thereof, on the other hand Green occasionally
makes passing statements or generalizations about Kant that suggest
he is more amenable to a reductionist reading of Kant than I, at least,
would have hoped.8
In the Introduction of Kant and Kierkegaard on Time and Eternity,
Green comments on chapter five, entitled “Kant: A Debt Both Obscure
and Enormous,” correctly pointing out that “Kant saw a role for divine
grace,” but claims that “he set aside as not being helpful for our moral
salvation questions regarding its mode of operation” (2011, 16). This
common impression is based on an incomplete understanding of the
central goals of Kant’s Religion. As I argue (Palmquist 2010, 2016a),
Kant is self-consciously avoiding entering the fray on discussions
relating to biblical theology; the goal of what he calls his “second
experiment” is not to defend one theology of grace over another, much
less to set aside all such theologies “as not being helpful for our moral
salvation,” but to provide a moral hermeneutic that any such theology
must employ, if the answers it provides to the questions of the mode
of grace’s operation are to be helpful (Kant 2016, 12). Kant never
denies that theologies of grace can be and often are intensely helpful
8 Along these lines, as mentioned above (see footnote 2), when preparing to reprint
Green 2000 as a chapter in Firestone and Palmquist 2006, Green edited his text in such a
way as to clarify the questionable statements, resulting in a more nuanced reading of
Kant’s approach. However, when he later reprinted that same essay again, as Chapter 4 in
Green 2011, he used the older, unedited version of his text, thus retaining certain question-
able claims about Kant’s alleged biases.
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to people in overcoming the debilitating effects of sin, or “radical evil”
as Kant calls it, on our moral decision-making ability. His critique of
all theologies of grace insists not that they be abandoned altogether
in favor of a rarefied “religion of pure reason” that cannot be instanti-
ated empirically, but only that those who adhere to a particular theo-
logical “answer” to the enigma of grace must do so with a profound
awareness of the limiting effects of the paradox of inwardness. That
is, we may be saved by grace through faith; but to affirm this subjec-
tive conviction as if it were an external fact is to transcend the limits
of the power of human reason, and religious believers who do this
almost always experience moral disempowerment, meaning that the
theological doctrine ends up having exactly the opposite of its
intended effect. Kant insists that the religious person who turns a
blind eye to the paradox of inwardness and affirms a tenet of religious
faith as if it were objectively true, rather than a symbolic expression
of one’s subjective hope, thereby destroys the humility that makes
them worthy to receive whatever grace God may be offering in the
first place.
Green continues his introductory summary of “Kant: A Debt” by
claiming that “Kant offered an entirely conceptual solution to our prob-
lem of defective moral willing.” According to Green’s Kant: “We over-
come our past moral mischoices merely by thinking our way out of
them: by basing our hope on the reasonable possibility of its [i.e., sal-
vation’s] availability to one who yearns for it” (2011, 16). I see two
problems with this portrayal of Kant’s position. First, while it may be
an accurate account of Kierkegaard’s reading of Kant, it is a caricature
of Kant’s actual approach in Religion. For Kant’s actual strategy in
Religion is not primarily conceptual and argumentative, but symbolic
and hermeneutic. Indeed, this—dare I say, Kierkegaardian?—feature
of his text is precisely what frustrates many commentators who find it
difficult to reconcile this book with the rest of Kant’s corpus. Through-
out Religion Kant never states or even hints that we can save our-
selves through our own mode of correct thinking. Rather, he casts
significant doubt on this possibility, consistently acknowledging that
our plight is so dire that “supernatural cooperation” may be needed in
order for human beings “to become good or better,” because the prob-
lem of “defective moral willing” is by definition intractable by human
reason alone (2016, 44). That is one of the key messages of Kant’s
book: religion arises as a response to the gap that opens up between
our awareness of reason’s weakness and our awareness of our own
inability, entirely through our own rational powers, to satisfy the need
that arises out of that weakness. This gap expresses itself in many
ways, but always as a manifestation of the paradox of inwardness.
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My second reservation about the foregoing quote from Kant and
Kierkegaard on Time and Eternity is that, while Green is quite correct
to say that, according to Kant, our hope in salvation requires us to
understand “the reasonable possibility of its availability,” that avail-
ability is not contingent on our yearning for salvation. Quite to the
contrary, in the fourth piece Kant goes to great pains to warn against
the religious delusion that comes from the mistaken impression that
our yearning is what pleases God. Instead, Kant’s position, though par-
adoxical, is clear: the only basis for reasonable hope of salvation from
the universal human condition of sin or radical evil is a revolution in
the very basis of our maxim-formation, in the part of our volitional
capacity that Kant calls our Gesinnung, which I translate as
“conviction.”9 If God is going to save a human being, Kant argues, we
must assume that God will do so on the basis of the holiness of our
moral conviction. The problem is that we ourselves do not have a clear
view of this elusive part of our nature, because it exists in an eternal
(or noumenal) dimension; for this reason and this reason alone, Kant
argues, our hope as to whether or not we have experienced a change of
heart can be based only on an honest assessment of own firm resolve
in following the dictates of the moral law as this resolve manifests
itself in real, spatiotemporal deeds—that is, in what Kant calls our
“lifestyle.”10
Green rightly objects to the position he attributes to Kant: “If evil is a
free and logically unnecessary event of this degree of seriousness, its
remedy cannot be a reasonable presumption of the possibility of divine
support. Such presumption would not only limit God’s freedom to act . . .;
it would also reduce the gravity of our initial free choice” (2011, 16). If
my interpretation is accurate, then Kant is innocent of this logical flaw
in argumentation. For Kant never claims that the remedy for evil is “a
reasonable presumption of the possibility of divine support.” The remedy
for evil is the wholesale conversion of an evil heart to a good heart, a
change which might require God’s prevenient grace or at least God’s
assistance in removing potential obstacles as we firmly resolve to make
the change. Kant’s claims regarding “reasonable presumption” are con-
sistently and humbly directed toward our knowledge of our own moral
9 The time-honored translation of Kant’s Gesinnung as “disposition” was replaced by
“attitude” in Werner Pluhar’s 2009 translation of Kant’s Religion. In Palmquist 2015, I
defend my use of “conviction” as having the advantage of being clearly volitional, as
opposed to these other options being more metaphysical and psychological, respectively. For
a summary of that argument, see Palmquist 2016a, 519–20.
10 Kant’s term Lebenswandel is typically translated as “way of life” or “life-conduct”; but
careful attention to the context of Kant’s usage of this term suggests that he has in mind
something very close to what we nowadays refer to as a person’s lifestyle. For a defense of
this translation, see Palmquist 2016a, 526–28.
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and spiritual state before God, never—as Green suggests, I think unfair-
ly—as a proud attempt to usurp control over God. Indeed, Kant’s whole
discussion of “pseudoservice” in the fourth piece of Religion is directed
against nothing more than the “religious delusion” that we human
beings are in any way capable of determining what God does or does not
do with respect to our eternal destiny. Kant’s claim is not that by trying
hard to be good, we force God to save us; this reductionist interpretation
runs entirely contrary to the whole tenor of his argument in the much-
misunderstood fourth piece. Rather, his claim is that, given the moral
make-up of human beings—as beings who are on the one hand animals
yet on the other hand possess a “personality” that condemns us to choose
our own destiny—the best we can do is to trust that God has given us
the moral law so that we might obey it and that if God does exist in any
form other than as the voice of conscience, then God’s most likely mode
of judging us will be moral.
If I am right about the approach to morality and religion in Kant’s
Religion, then far from going too far in claiming that Kierkegaard relied
on Kant, it turns out that Green’s masterly assessment of the Kant-
Kierkegaard relationship may not have gone far enough. For in that
case, Kierkegaard was not merely responding to Kant by saying “No” to
his prioritization of reason over history; he was also taking up the very
paradox of time and eternity that Kant himself had enshrined as the
true core of human religiosity, and he was expanding it into a full-
fledged theory of what it means to be religious. In other words, Kierke-
gaard’s “ethical stage of life” may be an accurate portrayal of the moral
agent Kant describes in Groundwork (Kant 2012) and the second Cri-
tique (Kant 1997), but the religious person who is the focus of Kant’s
Religion is surely someone who has already entered into Kierkegaard’s
third, “religious stage of life.” Indeed, while it may be true that “Kant
has no philosophy of human emotional and erotic love” (Green 2011, 23),
he does provide numerous clues for such a philosophy, especially in Reli-
gion, and these clues are to a large extent what Kierkegaard picks up
and transforms into what he calls “Religion B.”
Up to now this essay has focused on the task of providing an overview
of and reflections on Ronald Green’s impressive work on Kant and Kier-
kegaard and their influence on our understanding of the relationship
between religion and morality. In conclusion, let me be more direct and
ask, though still in a spirit of friendship: Is Green’s Kant a moral reduc-
tionist when it comes to religion, or not? Moreover, did Kierkegaard por-
tray Kant fairly in the person of (for example) Judge William, or is there
room in an accurate reading of Kant’s Religion to acknowledge at least a
foretaste of Kierkegaard’s more well-developed paradox of inwardness?
Regardless of how Green may answer these concluding questions, he
is to be congratulated for a lifetime of devoted scholarly work that has
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been so influential to so many and in so many different ways. As I am
confident that he has no intention of putting aside scholarship during
his retirement from teaching, but is actively considering where and how
to devote his scholarly energies in the coming years, I shall dare to end,
as a friend and fellow American but also as a colleague (albeit, one who
resides safely out of reach, on the other side of the world), by challenging
Green to consider going back to his scholarly starting point—although
perhaps not all the way back to his doctoral dissertation on population
growth! I encourage him to go back to his seminal reflections on the
deep structure of religious reason that shows its influence so pervasively
in human cultural traditions, both religious and secular. Especially now,
as we are already over halfway through the second decade of the twenty-
first century, apparently non-religious traditions such as those develop-
ing through the use of social media are sorely in need of Green’s insight-
ful analysis. However, I dare to recommend that such analysis will fare
better if it is accompanied by a more intentional focus on the paradox of
inwardness as it is already present (though so easily overlooked) in Kant
and (more overtly) in Kierkegaard.
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